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
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AUTOMOBILE CRASH SENSOR SIGNAL PROCESSOR

C. J. Bader



NOVEMBER 1973

FINAL REPORT


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
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16. Abstract <p>The Crash Sensor Signal Processor described interfaces between an automobile-installed doppler radar and an air bag activating solenoid or equivalent electromechanical device. The processor utilizes both digital and analog techniques to produce an output pulse when specified input signal amplitude and frequency conditions are met. The device is intended to be implemented with monolithic MOS large scale integrated circuitry and Bipolar driver. The design and reliability studies indicate that very low cost and very high reliability can be achieved concurrently by monolithic techniques without compromising Processor performance.</p>					
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PREFACE

The work described in this report was performed in the context of an overall program at the Transportation Systems Center to evaluate anticipatory crash sensor concepts as applied to activation of automobile passive restraint systems. This report specifically examines the design and reliability of the signal processor associated with a radar sensor. The program is sponsored by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Office of Vehicle Structures Research, Department of Transportation. This program supports Government activities designed to promote greater safety on the nations highways and reduce injury and fatalities in traffic accidents.

We are grateful for the assistance provided by the Defense, Space, and Special Systems Group of the Burroughs Corporation, Paoli, Pennsylvania, who conducted the signal processor design and reliability studies.

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SECTION 1. INTRODUCTION

PURPOSE

This report covers the primary efforts of Contract DOT-TSC-409, encompassing a 60-day effort for high reliability design and failure rate prediction of a monolithic Crash-Sensor Signal Processor MOS LSIC and Bipolar driver.

An optimum cost vs. reliability basic approach that included technology, circuit techniques and circuit-logic design was established. This design was evaluated for quantitative reliability characteristics including a detailed failure modes and effects analysis.

A variety of significant self-testing redundant and voting configurations were defined and tabulated for cost vs. reliability effectiveness. The results fully demonstrate that very low cost ($< \$10$) and very high reliability ($> .999$ per year) can be achieved concurrently by monolithic techniques without compromising processor performance.

A breadboard version of the basic signal processor circuit was also established and three deliverable assemblies have been fabricated.

BASIC APPROACH

The advanced status of solid state large scale integrated circuit technology forms a totally appropriate and flexible basis for an optimum hardware realization of the Automobile Crash-Sensor Signal Processor.

The required analog input and digital logic processing functions can be implemented on a single medium-size MOS chip and combined with a Bipolar power driver circuit within a hermetic IC package. As a result, the Crash-Sensor Signal Processor circuit is basically compatible with very low cost, very high reliability hardware techniques. Furthermore, additional functions (e.g., self test), redundant chips and voting configurations are all attainable within the basic price vs. complexity guideline ($< \$10$).

Subsequent design approach discussions will show that a series of logical choices can be made to fundamentally establish an optimum cost vs. reliability monolithic approach and that intrinsic low cost and high reliability are "built in" throughout the design procedure. Reliability predictions and failure modes and effects analysis will then substantiate the design results.

SECTION 2

FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS

GENERAL

The Automobile Crash-Sensor Signal Processor performs the function of rendering a restraint deployment decision on the basis of input data from a doppler radar and impact switch sources. The objective of the specified processing is the anticipation of imminent collision in sufficient time to permit restraint deployment, while maintaining maximum practical protection against deployment under non-crash conditions.

In order to achieve this objective, the processor must evaluate the relative velocity of approach of a radar-detected object and extract the maximum possible conforming information within the limits imposed by the lead-time requirement. In the particular case of a low approach velocity, it is practical and desirable to delay the deploy decision until confirmation is obtained from a mechanical switch which is activated by the initial phases of the impact. At higher velocities, however, deployment must be initiated prior to the start of impact, and the deployment decision must be made on radar information alone. In this case, the processor must verify that the radar signal has the proper characteristics and must provide the deployment signal with proper degree of lead time.

Although self-checking and failure indication are not specific operational requirements, such provisions are essential if the required degree of reliability is to be achieved at low cost.

Triggering Criteria

The doppler radar (X-band) provides a nominally sinusoidal output voltage of a frequency proportional to the approach velocity. The constant of proportionality is 30.1 Hz/mph. Thus, a 10 mile per hour approach yields a doppler frequency of 301 Hz.

A legitimate radar return produces a minimum amplitude of 20 millivolts, peak-to-peak. No triggering is allowable for signals of less than 18 millivolts, and triggering must occur at 22 millivolts, provided other criteria are met.

Signals below 18 millivolts constitute Case I, for which no triggering is permitted. The other processing regimes involve signal amplitudes greater than this threshold and are defined below:

Case II. Signal frequency less than 500 ± 20 Hz or greater than 5000 ± 100 Hz (closing speed is less than 17 or greater than 166 mph): No triggering under any circumstances.

Case III. Signal frequency greater than 500 ± 20 Hz but less than 1000 ± 20 Hz (closing speed is between 17 and 33 mph): Triggering is within two milliseconds of the impact signal provided that N cycles of the radar signal have occurred within 150 milliseconds prior to the impact signal. N is to be a fixed number not less than 8 nor exceeding 20.

Case IV. Signal frequency is 1000 ± 20 Hz to 3000 ± 100 Hz (closing speed is 33 to 100 mph): Triggering within 5 milliseconds after N' cycles of signal occur; N' is a fixed number not exceeding 20 nor less than 8 but not necessarily equal to N.

Case V. Signal frequency is 3000 to 5000 Hz (± 100 Hz) (closing speed is between 100 to 170 mph): Triggering is allowable for more than 8 cycles received, but triggering is not mandatory.

The above triggering criteria are depicted graphically in Figure 2-1.

System Functional Organization

Although a purely analog (i.e., filter/detector) approach to the processing is feasible, the stated criteria are manifestly compatible with a digital system design. The approach described in this report is a digital one, and the following system organization description is therefore couched in digital terms.

Figure 2-2 depicts the system organization. The radar signal is amplified and digitized in such a manner that one pulse is produced for each cycle which exceeds the action threshold (20 millivolts, peak-to-peak, at the input). The incoming pulse rate is compared with the reference clock oscillator, and the frequency regime is thereby established. The latter operation controls the selection of the triggering mode, so that appropriate count accumulations must be achieved before deployment.




Figure 2-1. Triggering Criteria




Figure 2-2. System Functional Organization

If a Case III situation is established, additional criteria must be met. Thus, deployment occurs only if the count reaches N and the impact switch confirmation is received before expiration of the 150-millisecond timing window.

Failure Modes

Inasmuch as the consequences of a system malfunction may vary greatly, depending on the exact nature of the defect, it is necessary to classify failure modes and to separately examine the corresponding failure probabilities before making an overall reliability or cost-effectiveness judgement. Four primary failure modes are defined as follows:

- a. Triggering occurs with no signal, or with a signal below the 50 percent of specified amplitude or cycle count, or more than 50 percent outside of the frequency limits.
- b. Triggering with the above parameters at over 50 percent but less than 100 percent of the specified values.
- c. Inability to trigger with a signal amplitude or cycle count greater than the threshold, but less than 1.5 times the threshold; or with a frequency inside the passband and removed from its limits by a factor of 1.5.
- d. Inability to trigger wherein the above factor is 1.5 or greater (including the totally inoperative case).

The relative weighting of each failure mode, and the effects of self-checking on the individual reliability figures, are fully discussed in section 4 of this report.

SECTION 3. DESIGN APPROACH

TECHNOLOGY SELECTION

Bipolar Driver

The Crash Sensor Signal Processor Circuit must provide direct drive for a restraint deploy solenoid or for an equivalent electromechanical device. This requirement involves output pulse currents on the order of ten amperes and inductive "kick" voltages on the order of 100 volts.

MOS devices are totally unsuited to these driver conditions, being practically limited to peak currents on the order of ten milliamperes and breakdown voltages on the order of 30 volts. Consequently, a circuit/technology partitioning is directly established where the low power logic deploy signal pulse is derived in the MOS processor LSIC chip and activates a high current Bipolar Driver small scale integrated circuit chip.

Although the peak current and low ON resistance requirements ($<0.5 \text{ ohm}$) of the output switch imply large geometry devices, energy dissipation under pulse conditions is only about 0.1 watt-second at essentially zero duty cycle. Consequently no significant thermal rise is involved and the two chips (MOS and Bipolar) can be combined in one standard IC package.

The speed ($t_r \approx 1 \text{ ms}$), saturation ($r_{on} < 0.5\Omega$), breakdown voltage ($\approx 100\text{V}$) and power dissipation conditions are all consistent with relatively simple double-diffusion processing of the required power switches, resistors, protection diodes and a Zener clamp.

MOS Processor

The immediate choice of an MOS approach for the Processor primary technology is based on the widely proven fact that MOS IC's are intrinsically less expensive and more reliable than Bipolar IC's, and that all the Crash-Sensor Processor functional and performance requirements and circuit/device characteristics are comfortably within established MOS capabilities.

The further choice of P-MOS, as opposed to C-MOS or N-MOS, is based on the following additional factors.

1. P-MOS technology is the most established, best understood, best controlled, most widely used, least critical, least expensive, and requires the fewest processing steps of the available MOS technologies.
2. The voltage levels, current allowances, frequency requirements and complexity of the Crash-Sensor Processor are completely compatible with high yield P-MOS techniques, especially ion-implant for low voltage, single supply operation.

Ion-implant is applicable to all MOS technologies as a means to obtain lower device threshold voltages, depletion mode current sources, tailored device threshold voltages, self-aligned gates, and high impedance resistors. Diffusionless wafer processing is also practical and being initiated. This additional technology/process feature is also selected for the most efficient realization of the Crash-Sensor Processor analog and digital functions.

CIRCUIT TECHNIQUES SELECTION

Digital Circuits

In addition to technology/process selection, specific digital circuit/logic design requires selection from several possible circuit techniques.

The two major categories of circuits are static (dc) and dynamic (ac). Dynamic logic is significantly more efficient than static logic because of the ability to utilize intrinsic capacity charge-storage for delay functions. On this basis, two-phase dynamic logic has also been selected for the Crash-Sensor Processor.

Gate Circuits

The dynamic MOS form of the basic inverter, NOR and NAND circuits is shown in Figure 3-1. A high resistance load (pull-up) device and a lower resistance input switch(es) are common to all configurations. The switch-load resistance ratio assures a sufficiently low zero level when the input switch is ON. The load device is also switched by ϕ_1 or ϕ_2 of the circuit clock so that conduction (ONE output) can occur only in the proper phase relation with associated circuits.

Figure 3-2 shows the manner in which complex gating functions can be realized under a single node (load device) with minimum device count. Note that with this type of circuit capability, device count is one load device plus one switch for each input (9). Similar complex structures can be realized with NAND (series) outputs although the example shown is a NOR (parallel) output.

Storage Circuits

Figure 3-3 illustrates the basic charge-storage delay function utilized in dynamic logic via a unit delay circuit. The capacity utilized is intrinsic distributed capacity associated with interconnects (≈ 0.2 pF) loaded only by the MOS gates ($> 10^{12}$ ohm). An additional device feature is the inclusion of non-critical series switches which serve to isolate the stored-charge at gates on out-of-phase clock periods.

The unit delay circuit shown is also the basis of a single shift register stage where the use of capacitor charge-storage results in less than one-third the device count that would be required with a d-c master-slave flip-flop implementation.

Figure 3-4 shows the three dynamic flip-flop configurations used in the Processor circuit design and evaluation. The sample and hold flip-flop is used for storage registers and pulse-to-level conversion. The J-K flip-flop is optimum for program and control functions. The toggle flip-flop is a special case J-K which sets on the input fall instead of the input rise and finds use in timing counter or accumulator functions.









Figure 3-1. Basic Gate Circuits





Figure 3-2. Complex NOR Gate




Figure 3-3. Unit Delay




Figure 3-4. Dynamic Flip-Flops

Analog Circuits

MOS Analog Techniques

The processing of analog signals with P-MOS devices requires the exploitation of circuit techniques which differ from those used in more conventional Bipolar amplifiers. In particular, complementary devices are not available so that voltage level translation problems occur between d-c stages. On the other hand, the virtually infinite input impedance of the MOS devices significantly simplifies interstage a-c coupling.

The key to optimum design of the required analog functions exists in utilization of ion-implant device threshold adjustment flexibilities. Depletion mode devices provide fairly ideal current sources for load (pull-up) elements, differential stage source current(s) and regulator supply current. The primary d-c interstage voltage translation problem from a differential stage to a grounded-source stage is practically solved by setting the differential stage active devices to a relatively low threshold ($\approx 2V$) and leaving the grounded-source device at a fairly high threshold ($\approx 4 V$). Additional device geometry control permits adjustment of depletion mode drain current.

Very high value (> 1 megohm), loose-tolerance resistors can be achieved by pinching P-region resistors with a control gate. Fairly close tolerance divider ratios are made by tapping a single diffused or P-resistance.

Because of the virtually infinite active device input impedance, very small monolithic capacitors are practical in conjunction with very high value pinch resistors.

The technique for implementation of a practical voltage regulator is shown in Figure 3-5. Again, the use of ion-implant technology permits the use of a constant current source (upper device) supplying a constant voltage source connected enhancement mode device (lower). The regulated voltage is then established as the threshold voltage of the lower (enhancement) device.

Power supply turn-on sensing can be most efficiently implemented by the circuit of Figure 3-6 where a depletion mode current source charges a small monolithic




Figure 3-5. Voltage Regulator Implementation




Figure 3-6. Power Supply Turn-On Sensing Implementation

capacitor. The initialization time (T_0) will then be established by the rate of the capacitor voltage charge ($dv/dt = \frac{IK}{C}$) and the threshold (V_T) of a following stage.

PROCESSOR DESIGN

Basic System

The basic processor design organization, indicating major functions and areas, is illustrated in Figure 3-7. Key areas are as follows:

Analog Preprocessing

A-C amplification (X100), Amplitude Detection (Comparator) and Digital Differentiator.

Digital Processing

- Master Oscillator and Regulator, and Clock Driver.
- 12-bit Frequency Period Timing Counter and Decoders.
- Frequency Consistency Subroutine 5-bit Register, 7-bit Counter, a 7-bit Comparator and Control.
- 5-bit Cycle Count Accumulator and Decoders.
- Four-Program Flip-Flops and Control Gates.
- Internal Control Gates.
- Power-On Detector(s) (T_0 , T'_0).
- Deploy Gate and Pulse Generator.

Bipolar Power Circuits

- Output Switches (series redundant)
- Output Drivers
- Power Supply Zener Clamp

A minimum number of external connections are required for direct signal processing. These are the doppler input signal (e_d), the impact switch line (S_i), the deploy output line (D) and B+ and Ground (5). Nine additional connections are available for efficient chip test and evaluation. These include the four-program flip-flops, the digitized input signal (a), and key internal signals.




Figure 3-7. Processor System

Logic

The Processor program exact design is shown in the state flow diagram of Figure 3-8. Since the decision point notations are abbreviated in the representation, the following definitions are pertinent:

- a: $e_d > e_{min} = 20 \text{ mV} \pm 10\%$, i.e., a TRUE output from the differential comparator.
- a_0 : The first comparator output pulse; which initiates processing.
- a_1 : The second comparator output pulse, representing the end of the first doppler signal cycle.
- t_4 : The period corresponding to the limit for the highest acceptable doppler frequency (5kHz).
- t_1 : The period corresponding to the limit for the lowest acceptable doppler frequency (500 Hz).
- N_8 : An accumulation (count) of eight doppler signal cycles.
- X: The output from the frequency consistency subroutine indicating that a cycle is improperly longer (>1.25) or improperly shorter ($<.75$) than the first cycle.
- $8t_4$: The period corresponding to eight cycles of the maximum acceptable doppler frequency (1.6 ms).
- $8t_3$: The period corresponding to eight cycles of the 3 kHz processing mode decision frequency (2.64 ms).
- $8t_2$: The period corresponding to eight cycles of the 1 kHz processing mode decision frequency (8.0 ms).
- $8t_1$: The period corresponding to eight cycles of the 500 Hz minimum acceptable doppler frequency (16.0 ms).
- T_i : The 150-ms period required as a check time when the doppler frequency is between 500 Hz and 1.0 kHz.
- S_i : The impact switch input (closure).
- N: The number of doppler signal cycles specified for triggering when the signal frequency is between 500 Hz and 1.0 kHz. The processor design configuration uses $N = 16$.
- N' : The number of doppler signal cycles specified for triggering when the signal frequency is between 1.0 kHz and 3.0 kHz. This design uses $N' = 20$.

STEADY STATE
-Signal below
threshold

INITIAL ACCEPT
-Initial Period
within Min-Max
limits
-Start ΔT_i
-Start ΔT_8

FREQUENCY CLASSIFICA-
TION
-Store t_a
-Check for X
 $= .75 t_a < t_n < 1.25 t_a$

$3\text{KHz} < f < 5\text{KHz}$

$1\text{KHz} < f < 3\text{KHz}$

$500\text{Hz} < f < 1\text{KHz}$

CLASS II DEPLOY




Figure 3-8. Processor State Flow Diagram

- N_9 : An accumulation of eight plus one doppler signal cycles as required for triggering when the signal frequency is between 3.0 kHz and 5.0 kHz.
- D: Restraint deployment triggering signal (16.0 ms duration).

The processor state flow program details are as follows:

S0: Steady State - where the doppler input signal level is below the 20 mV (pk-pk) voltage level threshold. All processing functions are clear and reset; especially timing (frequency) and cycle count.

All invalid signal conditions and a deploy output result in direct return to the steady state.

S11, S12: Initial Processing Check States - occurrence of a signal level greater than threshold (a_0) initiates the input switch timing window (T_i), the frequency validation and classifying windows ($8t_1, 8t_2, 8t_3, 8t_4$), and the initial accept or reject windows (t_1, t_4).

S21, S22, S23, S24: Frequency Classification States - If period (frequency) conditions are acceptable in S1 and S2 ($t_4 < t_a < t_1$), the doppler signal cycle count accepts a first pulse and the 5-bit first cycle period word (t_a) is loaded into the frequency consistency check register. Frequency classification then proceeds until 8 signal cycles have been counted or frequency inconsistency is indicated ($X = .75 t_a < t < 1.25 t_a$).

S31, S32: Low Frequency Deploy States - If the eight cycle count (N_8) internal signal occurs after window $8t_2$ expires and before window $8t_1$ expires, the program advances to S31, looking for an $N(16)$ cycle count before window T_i expires. Normal satisfaction of S31 ($N \cdot \bar{T}_1$) produces advance to the direct-to-deploy (Class II) state S32, which leads to deploy when an impact switch signal occurs before window T_i expires.

S4: Median Frequency (Class III Deploy) State - This state is achieved when N_8 occurs after timing window $8t_3$ expires and before timing window $8t_2$ expires. Deploy is realized when $N'(20)$ cycle counts occur before window T_i expires.

S5: High Frequency (Class IV Deploy) State - This state is achieved when N_8 occurs after timing window $8t_4$ expires and before timing window $8t_3$ expires. Deploy occurs when one additional count (N_9) is realized before window T_i expires.

D (S6): The deploy state activates the power switches for 16 ms to release the restraint system or other device. The processor cycling loop is then closed by return to S0.

Consideration of the program paths and decisions will show that the processor design is highly weighted toward rejecting invalid signals by a variety of checks and balances. As a consequence, it follows that random logic features are most likely to result in nondelivery of an output rather than spurious delivery of an output. The system design is also weighted against spurious outputs by the program flip-flop state code assignments included in Figure 3-8. In particular, it may be seen that maximum distinction between steady state and initial check state(s) vs. direct-to-deploy states is established by having a maximum number of ZERO's in the former and a maximum number of ONE's in the latter.

Special Circuits

Analog Channel

A schematic of the MOS operational amplifier (X100), differential comparator and reference voltage regulator is shown in Figure 3-9. The operational amplifier and comparator can be seen to be largely identical with each comprising a difference amplifier stage followed by two stages of grounded-source voltage gain. The operational amplifier requires two gain-breaking (stabilization) networks; one ($5M \Omega$ -10 pF) between the two grounded-source stages and the second ($100K \Omega$ -20 pF) on the feedback resistance. The simple but effective monolithic voltage regulator is included directly in the channel. Because of the novelty of MOS analog circuits this design was breadboarded and thoroughly evaluated using discrete components including high (4V) and low (2V) enhancement mode




Figure 3-9. MOS Analog Channel

insulated gate MOS transistors and depletion mode junction field effect transistors. The resulting amplifier performance includes an open loop gain of 10,000 and a closed loop 3 dB frequency of 10 kHz for the X100 amplifier. The comparator transfer function is $\pm 5\%$, yielding a full channel switching accuracy of $10 \text{ mV} \pm .5 \text{ mV}$.

Oscillator and Clock Driver

The oscillator and clock driver circuits were breadboarded and checked in accordance with the schematic of Figure 3-10. Again, discrete enhancement and depletion mode field effect transistors were used and the oscillator phase shift network was mechanical with a 4-section R-C combination yielding efficient performance at 100 kHz.

Because of the regulator circuit simplicity, this section has an independent (of the analog channel) regulator, providing almost complete immunity to normal supply voltage variations.

Power-On Signal (T_o)

The processor initialization circuit is shown in Figure 3-11 and includes the basic current-source and capacitor turn-on detector in combination with a d-c cross-coupled latch for sharp pulse generation. This circuit was also verified using discrete parts and indicated conformance with expected principles.

SELF-TEST PROCESSOR

Purpose and Approach

The design and study of the Crash-Sensor Signal Processor with auxiliary self-test features are based on the complete fulfillment of the reliability vs. cost analysis with operator malfunction indication. Obviously, a meaningful indication must be based on a self-test program that exercises critical Signal Processor functions at intervals and alarms upon test failures.

In choosing the self-test intervals, consideration was given to two modes, one of which involved tests during automobile operation and the second used at engine-start only.




Figure 3-10. Oscillator and Clock Driver




Figure 3-11. Power Turn-On Detector

Since engine-start occurs at an average interval of thirty operating (driving) minutes (or less) this interval provides more than ample improvement in MTBF requirements for the electronics. Additionally, the test at engine-start is much more simple to mechanize including elimination of a requirement to distinguish test and input signal processing as would be required in test during vehicle operation.

On the above bases, the engine-start test mode was a clear-cut preference, permitting all extra logic and circuitry to be dedicated to a comprehensive self-test program.

The self-test program developed performs more than the minimal checks implied for the specified failure modes analysis since no-go conditions are also checked. These additional test steps were added when it was recognized that they had only a small complexity impact beyond the basic requirements.

Mechanization of the test functions also makes maximum use of established processor functions so that only approximately 50% of the potential test circuit failures are due to add-on devices.

Self-Test Functions

Figure 3-12 shows the self-test functional design including analog features to provide digitally selectable signal amplitudes. Key features are as follows:

Test Signal Selection - The input to the analog channel is selectable between the doppler signal input (e_d) and the test signal input (e_t). Appropriate test amplitudes are provided by a tapped resistor divider network with full supply swing at the input and low-level square waves at the output. Selection is accomplished by series switches and simple logic gates.

The basic test signal and frequency selection is provided by utilizing the existing 12-bit Processor timing counter (PROC CNTR bits 1,2,5,6). At this signal level, selection is purely logic gating.




Figure 3-12. Self Test Functions

Deploy Pulse Signal - Implementation of the test capability requires insertion of disconnect gates between the deploy pulse generator and the deploy driver so the restraint system will not be actuated. As a practical consequence the deploy drivers cannot be included in the test process. However, the low device count and redundancy against spurious outputs in the driver permits a sufficiently high reliability without test.

Because the series redundant deploy drivers are each driven by a separate (P1, P2) pulse generator output, the test deploy signal (d) is gated from both lines requiring that both switch, i.e., $d = P1 \cdot P2$.

Impact Switch Signal ($S_i(tst)$) - For obvious reasons the impact switch cannot be actuated in the test mode; hence, a representative signal must be otherwise generated. This is accomplished by again using a 12-bit processor counter output (bit 12).

Test Program - The test program requires four flip-flops and fairly simple associated gates. Program input information includes the following.

Test deploy signal (d) - new

Processor Program Outputs; B,C,D - existing

Processor Signals - T_0 , N(16), N'(20), a - existing
Nineteen Cycle Count (N_{19}) - derived from the Processor cycle count accumulator.

Test Gate and Lamp Driver - The test gate output (Tst) activates the vehicle warning lamp during the test cycle and remains on when any test failure occurs. Consequently, the indicator lamp and circuit are checked for operation during test. In addition the signal (Tst) provides the driver and doppler input disconnect action.

Test Program

Figure 3-13 shows the detailed self-test program state flow diagram which comprises 11 states of single channel flow plus one failure state latch condition. The decision point abbreviations have the following definitions:

d:	Test deploy signal
S ₀ :	Processor Program Steady State
T ₀ :	Power-on Initialization Signal
N', N ₂₀ :	20-cycle accumulation signal
B ₀ :	Processor Program Flip-Flop B ₀ presence indicating initial process indicating initial process states S ₀ + S ₁₁ + S ₁₂ , only.
C ₀ :	Processor Program Flip-Flop C ₀ presence indicating initial process states S ₀ + S ₁ , only.
N ₁₆ :	16-cycle accumulation signal.
S _i :	Impact switch test signal - S _i (tst) = 102 ms
N ₁₉ , N'-1:	19-cycle accumulation signal.

The test program state activities are as follows:

TS10: Power On and Initialization State - At battery power connection on engine-start the test cycle is started, with the warning lamp on and the Processor unconstrained except for deploy driver disconnect and analog input transfer to the test signal.

The state is held until the Processor is in steady state (S₀) and the initialization signal (T₀) are attained unless a spurious deploy indicates failure.

No-Go Tests - In the test modes, after TS10, the Processor timing counter is enabled for signal generation which must normally be properly ignored or detected.

TS11: - A median frequency (2.5 kHz) subthreshold (10 mV) signal is applied until the process counter 100 ms (S_i (tst)) window expires.




Figure 3-13. Self Test Program

Under these conditions no analog comparator output (a), deploy (d) or other than steady-state (S0) Processor condition should occur.

TS12: The test input signal is increased to well above threshold (50 mV) and the test frequency is reduced to below the acceptable lower frequency ($312 \text{ Hz} < 500 \text{ Hz}$).

Under these conditions the Processor is checked for initial states signal rejection activity only ($S0 + S11 + S12 = B_0$) for the 100 ms period.

TS13: The test signal amplitude is maintained at a relatively high level (50 mV) but the test frequency is raised to above the highest acceptable processing frequency ($10 \text{ kHz} > 5 \text{ kHz}$).

Again, the Processor is checked for program activity in the early check states only ($S0 + S11 = C_0$) for the 100 ms period.

Go Tests: In the go tests the Processor must exhibit a proper pattern of behavior. This is primarily established by the status at a significant cycle count and the concurrence of the deploy signal and its activating internal signal.

TS21, TS22: The test signal amplitude is set marginally above the minimum amplitude threshold (25 mV) with the frequency in the Class II deploy range ($500 \text{ Hz} < 625 \text{ Hz} < 1 \text{ kHz}$).

In this mode the Processor should not advance to a direct-to-deploy state or provide a deploy signal until the N(16) processor signal occurs, as checked in TS21.

TS22 then checks that normal accumulator disable occurs (N'(20) NOT) and that the deploy signal is concurrent with the application of the test impact switch signal.

TS30: This is a processing recovery state which verifies that the deploy pulse terminates and the Processor returns to steady state in the absence of any test signal.

TS31, TS32: In this go category the Processor is checked for Class III operation with a median test frequency (2.5 kHz) and a minimum test amplitude (25 mV). Since deploy must normally occur on the $N' = 20^{\text{th}}$ cycle count the processor is checked for no deploy through the 19^{th} cycle count (TS31) and concurrent 20^{th} count and deploy in TS32.

TS40; TS0: The test signal is removed and upon attaining Processor steady state conditions in TS40 the test program advances to the normal process enable condition (TS0), where all test constraints are removed.

TS50: Failure state - Any test program failure path decision point failure latches this state which is a distinct condition. In addition, the test program can stay locked in a test state due to the nonoccurrence of an appropriate signal. Both conditions result in nonattainment of normal operating conditions with the warning light latched ON.

SECTION 4. RELIABILITY - COST ANALYSIS

APPROACH

This section describes the reliability and cost analyses conducted by the Burroughs Product Analysis Section during the design phase of the Automobile Crash-Sensor Signal Processor (hereafter referred to as the Sensor) program for the U.S. Department of Transportation. Throughout this study, the underlying concept was to deliver a reliable and inexpensive system with provisions for built-in redundancy and fail-safe circuitry to ensure maximum safety, considering the triggering criteria outlined in Section 2.

Emphasis was placed on protection against accidental system firing and observance of the costs constraints specified in Exhibit B of REP No. TSC-TME-0063-ES. To ensure a reliable design, a comprehensive Failure Mode and Effects Analysis was conducted to pinpoint any reliability design weaknesses. This analysis resulted in the incorporation of several reliability design improvements.

The general approach followed in the study is outlined below:

- a. Analysis of the program concepts and proposed technology to ensure compatibility.
- b. Development of a system prediction model consistent with the proposed MOS technology.
- c. Analysis of system elements and logic by means of a Failure Mode and Effects Analysis to determine the effects of specific failures on the system.
- d. Apportionment of system prediction over functional areas using complexity as the apportionment parameter.
- e. Categorization of all possible failures and apportionment of their expected failure rates into four failure classification as defined in the original RFP and enumerated herein.
- f. Analysis of reliability and cost to provide various configurations of improved reliability at different cost increments. This analysis employed the Burroughs Product Assurance Reliability Computer Analysis Programs.
- g. Selection of optimum configurations.

SUMMARY

The following discussion summarizes the salient numerical results of the Sensor reliability and cost analyses and provides recommendations concerning the selection of system configurations.

- a. The configurations considered are shown in Figures 4-1 through 4-7. The reliability and cost for each of these configurations, with and without device burn-in, and the relative ranking of each configuration based on reliability and cost, are given in Table 4-1.

The configuration in Figure 4-3 has the highest predicted reliability. However, the results of all three system redundant configurations (Figure 4-2, 4-3, and 4-4) are very close. The optimum selection among these three could therefore be based on other criteria not considered in this analysis.

- b. The effect of repair on predicted reliability is illustrated in Table 4-2.



Figure 4-1. Basic System




Figure 4-2. Redundant MOS




Figure 4-3. Redundant MOS and Bipolar




Figure 4-4. MOS/Bipolar Redundant





Figure 4-5. Voting MOS Only

Figure 4-6. Voting MOS and Redundant Bipolar




Figure 4-7. Voting MOS/Bipolar

TABLE 4-1. SYSTEM CONFIGURATION RELIABILITY AND COST
(NO REPAIR)

Configuration	Figure No.	RELIABILITY (Predicted/Weighted)				Cost		
		500 Hrs. Operation	2500 Hrs. Operation	5000 Hrs. Operation	10 ⁵ Pieces/Year	10 ⁶ Pieces/Year	10 ⁷ Pieces/Year	Ranking
Redundant MOS & Bipolar with burn-in	4-4	.999766/.998213	.994500/.962280	.979602/.876999	\$4.90	\$3.78	\$2.97	1
MOS/Bipolar Redundant with burn-in	4-5	.999765/.998210	.994474/.962219	.979507/.876823	4.90	3.78	2.97	2
Redundant MOS with burn-in	4-3	.999727/.998175	.994307/.962093	.979223/.876660	4.60	3.58	2.82	3
Voting MOS & Bipolar Redundant with burn-in	4-7	.999492/.995303	.988357/.909915	.958158/.737303	6.15	4.75	3.70	4
Voting MOS/Bipolar with burn-in	4-8	.999489/.995295	.988292/.909772	.957937/.736959	6.45	4.95	3.85	6
Voting MOS only with burn-in	4-6	.999453/.995265	.988166/.909739	.957787/.737018	5.85	4.55	3.55	5
Redundant MOS & Bipolar without burn-in	4-4	.999079/.993152	.979602/.876999	.929644/.665420	4.60	3.53	2.77	7
MOS/Bipolar Redundant without burn-in	4-5	.999074/.993140	.979507/.876823	.929343/.665043	4.60	3.53	2.77	8
Redundant MOS without burn-in	4-3	.999001/.993075	.979223/.876660	.928925/.664906	4.30	3.33	2.62	9
Voting MOS & Bipolar Redundant without burn-in	4-7	.998012/.982435	.958158/.737303	.864196/.411940	5.85	4.50	3.50	11
Voting MOS/Bipolar without burn-in	4-8	.998000/.982404	.957937/.736959	.863561/.411435	6.15	4.70	3.65	12
Voting MOS only, without burn-in	4-6	.997935/.982359	.957787/.737018	.863528/.411621	5.55	4.30	3.35	10
Basic System with burn-in	4-2	.996892/.959856	.936155/.814762	.876387/.663836	3.55	2.75	2.20	13
Basic System without burn-in	4-2	.973956/.921324	.876387/.663836	.768055/.440679	3.25	2.50	2.00	14

TABLE 4-2. PREDICTED RELIABILITY (WITHOUT AND WITH REPAIR)
(CONFIGURATION 4-4)

Time Span (yrs)	Oper. hrs	Failure Classification (without Repair)				Failure Classification (with Repair)			
		I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV
1	500	.99999987	.99999987	.99999999	.99978917	1	1	1	.9999999983
5	2500	.99999690	.99999682	.99999986	.99502654	1	1	1	.9999999624
10	5000	.99998762	.99998733	.99999942	.98148439	1	1	1	.9999998501

- c. The approximate cost of the optimum configurations is about \$4.90 each (see Table 4-1.)
- d. Manufacturer burn-in of all chips is recommended.
- e. All the above recommended configurations have built-in self-checking circuitry which can be converted to a failure indication system for the automobile operator by the addition of only an indicator lamp on the dashboard.
- f. The self testing circuit would check for system failures every time the automobile engine is started (approximately every 30 minutes).
- g. The basic circuitry proposed is fail safe designed. The failure rate by failure classification indicates that when failures do occur in the basic building blocks that the system will most often fail safe (Classification IV). Refer to Table 4-3.

TABLE 4-3. FAILURE RATE BY FAILURE CLASSIFICATION (BASIC DESIGN CONFIGURATION)

<u>Failure Classification</u>	<u>(Failures/million hours)</u>
I	.705
II	.713
III	.151
IV	24.820

The functional area apportionments, the failure classification apportionment and the failure mode and effects qualitative analyses were accomplished concurrently. In this way, an in-depth understanding of the system design techniques and problems could be accomplished while the quantitative calculations were developed. This led to an integrated design/reliability product. It is appropriate now, however, to discuss these analyses separately.

DETERMINATION OF BASIC FAILURE RATES

The bulk of the Sensor system is contained on one monolithic P-MOS integrated circuit chip, which includes the processor, analog preprocessing, digital processing, power supply turn-on detection, oscillator and clock driver, and voltage regulator circuitry. Self-check malfunction indication circuitry may also be added to this chip as an option. The remainder of the Sensor system is contained on a Bipolar chip and consists of a high power current switch and a P-N junction Zener diode clamp. For purposes of establishing an overall failure rate prediction, the circuitry is divided into three main groups:

- a. P-MOS circuitry
 - (1) Basic circuitry
 - (2) Self check malfunction indication circuitry
- b. Bipolar high power (current) switch
- c. Bipolar P-N junction Zener diode clamp

P-MOS Failure Rate Model

The failure rate prediction model used during this study for determining the failure rate of the P-MOS circuitry is developed in references (a) and (b). This model, which evaluates the effect of chip complexity, packaging, and wire bonds, was developed under Rome Air Development Center sponsorship and is based on a survey of industry experimental results and available published information. The model is applicable for predicting the failure rate of circuits that meet the following set of conditions:

- a. The circuits are commercially available MOS circuits manufactured with commonly used materials, processes and techniques.
- b. Early failures and gross defects have been removed by quality screening.
- c. There is evidence from qualifications on other tests that the devices are typical of their type.
- d. No extreme or unique conditions exist in assembly or in subsequent handling or application that might significantly degrade the reliability.
- e. The directly applied or full-induced voltages and currents are held within the maximum ratings specified by the manufacturer.
- f. No voltage surges, transients or spikes are allowed to reach the devices.

Equation (1) below defines the model applied in determining the failure rate of the Sensor P-MOS circuitry.

$$\lambda_M = \lambda_B \pi_T \pi_P \pi_E \pi_Q \pi_F \pi_C + \lambda_W \pi_T \quad (1)$$

where,

λ_M	Total failure rate of the microcircuit
λ_B	Basic failure rate for a particular type of circuit
λ_W	Failure rate of the wire bonds
π_T	Temperature adjustment factor
π_P	Packaging adjustment factor
π_E	Environmental adjustment factor
π_Q	Stringency of screening adjustment factor
π_F	Fabrication conditions adjustment factor
π_C	Circuit size and complexity adjustment factor

Basic Circuitry Failure Rate Prediction

The numerical values established for each of the parameters of Eq. (1) are discussed first for the basic P-MOS circuitry and then recalculated to include the optional self check malfunction indication circuitry. For the basic circuitry:

- Basic Failure Rate (λ_B). A basic failure rate of 10 failures/million hours is specified in reference (a). This rate is based on chips produced prior to 1971. However, newer devices embodying improvement in design and processing have substantially lower failure rates. The chips that will be used in the Sensor will not be produced in quantity until at least 1974. It is expected that these devices will have even lower failure rates than those of today's devices for which data is available. Therefore, a proper adjustment of the above failure rate to 5 failures/million hours would be consistent.

- . Adjusting Factor for the Operating Temperature (π_T). The basic failure rate as based on an ambient operating temperature of 125°C. Assuming the activation energy for average degradation on operating life is 5Kcal/mole, π_T at 100°C maximum temperature $\cong 0.5$.

- . Wire Bonds Failure Rate (λ_W). For a system using ultrasonic bonding on the package bond, aluminum wire, gold plated packages and aluminum metalization on the chip, the failure rate for wire bonds can be calculated by

$$\lambda_W = (.002/10^6 \text{ hrs.}) W$$

where W is the number of wires connecting different points within the package, as well as those to package leads. With W=800,

$$\lambda_W = 1.6 \text{ failures/million hours}$$

- . Adjustment Factor for Package Type (π_P). The following values for π_P are for:
 - a. A chip glassed with a material that does not introduce an instability.
 - b. A gold-silicon eutectic chip-to-package bond.
 - c. A gold wire thermal compression on aluminum, 1 percent silicon wire with ultrasonic bonds.
 - d. Hermetic package.

$$\pi_P = 1 + .05 L$$

where L is the number of active leads in excess of 10. The number of active leads for the system will be 5, therefore L for the Sensor will be 0. Four or five pins will be used as test points. System operation is not dependent whatsoever on these test pins.

$$\text{Therefore } \pi_P = 1$$

- . Environmental Adjustment Factor (π_E). The value of π_E for a mobile ground environment is

$$\pi_E = 7.0$$

- . Quality of Screening Adjustment Factor (π_Q). For optimum screening, $\pi_Q = 1$. This includes the following:

- Vendor, line and product qualifications
- Line discipline on an interference basis
- Failure feedback with continuous basis
- Screens and burn-in
- Traceability of test data

- . Fabrication Conditions Adjustment Factors (π_F). Circuits that have been in production for at least one year on a given line with line discipline on an interference basis, with failure feedback and continuous corrective action, and with firm process controls to prevent instabilities in both the gate and field oxides will have

$$\pi_F = 1$$

- . Circuit Size and Complexity Adjustment Factors (π_C). π_C is defined as

$$= 0.5 + 0.5 \left(\frac{A}{5000} \right)$$

where A is the active area of the chip in square mils. The active area of the chip includes everything except border regions (scribe lines, contact lands and test devices) of the chip. π_C was defined in terms of area rather than in terms of gates or bits because of the difficulties involved in defining gates and bits. π_C equation was derived with the following assumptions:

- π_C should be unity for an area of 5000 square mils.
- Circuits having a chip area of 5000 square mils are assumed to have a failure rate that is half due to area-independent effects and half due to area-dependent effects.
- The effects of area on the failure rates are assumed to be less than if the number of defects were linearly proportional to area. It is likely that a lower average defect density exists in larger area chips in order to achieve a good yield.

$$A = 10,000$$

$$\pi_C = 1.5$$

Therefore, evaluating equation 1 we obtain

$$\begin{aligned}\lambda_M &= (5/10^6 \text{ hrs.})(.5)(1)(7)(1)(1)(1.5) + (1.6/10^6 \text{ hrs.})(.5) \\ &= 26.25/10^6 \text{ hrs.} + 0.8/10^6 \text{ hrs.} \\ \lambda_M &= 27.05 \text{ failures/million hrs.}\end{aligned}$$

This failure rate indicates how many malfunctions within the basic MOS chip will be expected in a million hours of operation. However, as the Failure Mode and Effect Analysis will show, this is not the number of chip failures expected. Certain specific malfunctions will not hinder the operation of the system and therefore are not system failures. This rate is to be construed as a basic chip malfunction rate only, which will be developed into a meaningful failure rate.

Basic Circuitry with Self-Check Test Circuit Failure Rate Prediction

A test circuit design has been developed for the Sensor system. The test circuit and basic system are included on one MOS chip. The basic circuitry covers about 10,000 square mils of surface area and the test circuit an additional 2500 square mils. The test circuit will have two basic functions of which one or both can be utilized simultaneously.

The test circuit will be needed in any on-line redundant system configuration (this does not include voting logic configurations) to determine when one redundant branch has failed so that the system can utilize the other branch. The test circuit will monitor each redundant branch and tell the sensing switch logic to switch to the alternate branch when one has failed. Each redundant branch will have its own test circuit since this simplifies the design and minimizes manufacturing costs (only one type chip need be made).

Second, the test circuit can be utilized as a failure indicator system for the automobile operator. The test circuit will check the Sensor system every time the automobile is started (approximately every 30 minutes). If a failure has occurred, an indicator on the dashboard will light.

The failure rate prediction for the test circuit uses the math model given in eq.(1). π_C designates the factor that weights the circuit size and complexity. From eq. (1),

$$\pi_C = 0.5 + 0.5 \left(\frac{A}{5000} \right)$$

where A is the active area of the chip in square mils. π_C is the only factor changed in the MOS prediction when the test circuit is considered. "A" for the basic system plus the test circuit is 12,500 square mils. Therefore $\pi_C = 1.75$ (π_C for the basic system alone = 1.5).

A failure rate for the basic and test circuit chip can be predicted as follows

$$\frac{1.75 - 1.5}{1.5} = 16.7\% \text{ change}$$

$$27.05 \times .167 = 4.52 \text{ failures}/10^6 \text{ hrs. additional for the test circuit.}$$

Bipolar High Power (Current) Switch Failure Rate Prediction

The Bipolar High Power (Current) Switch consists of an eight element arrangement (4 transistors and 4 diffused resistors) for a high current ($\approx 10A$), short duration switching deploy signal. RADC has established a failure rate of .07 failures/million hours for a more complex but similar type device. These devices have on an average 20 elements. Therefore, for our function at maximum operating temperature of $100^\circ C$, the basic failure rate is:

$$\frac{8}{20} \times .07 \text{ (F}/10^6 \text{ hrs.)} = .028 \text{ F}/10^6 \text{ hrs.}$$

Our K factor for vehicle mounted devices is 7, therefore, device failure rate is:

$$.028 \times 7 = 0.196 \text{ failures/million hours}$$

Bipolar Zener Diode Clamp Prediction

This prediction is based on the mathematical model presented in the RADC reliability notebook. An assumed maximum operating temperature of $100^\circ C$ was used in making the calculation. Power rating based on standard derating curve where the temperature derating point is $25^\circ C$ and the maximum junction temperature is $175^\circ C$. Stress ratio for the device was assumed to have an actual power ratio of 0.3 to the maximum rated power dissipated at $25^\circ C$. A vehicle mounted environment was considered. Therefore

$$\lambda = 0.020664 \text{ failures/ million hours}$$

FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS (FMEA)

The detailed FMEA is included with this report as Appendix A. The information included is as follows:

Column 1	Name and/or Code of the element, logic or gate in the function being examined.
Column 2	The basic function of the element, logic or gate being examined.
Column 3	The failure mode associated with the element, logic or gate being examined. These include short, open, partial short, stuck high and stuck low.
Column 4	In column 4 are noted the mechanisms of failure which could result in the mode described in column 3. The failure mechanisms considered were: hole in oxide, ion migration, and electromigration.
Column 5	The effect that the failure mode described in column 3 will have on the function is described here.
Column 6	The effect that the failure mode described in column 3 will have on the system is described here.
Column 7	The failure rate apportionment for the failure mode described in column 3. This indicates the number of expected failures of this mode per million hours of operation.
Column 8	Remarks
Column 9	Classification of each failure mode into one the four failure classifications as follows: I Triggering with signal not present, or with signal less than 50 percent of the specified threshold for amplitude, frequency or cycle count. II Triggering with signal amplitude, frequency or cycle count between threshold and 50 percent of threshold. III Inability to trigger with amplitude, frequency or cycle count greater than threshold, but less than 1.5 times the threshold value. IV Inability to trigger with frequency, amplitude, or cycle count 1.5 times threshold or greater. (This includes the completely inoperable state.)

Functional Area and Failure Classification Apportionment

The system is composed of discrete areas, each with one or more specific functions. These functional areas are the basis for our studies into how the system operates, i.e., interdependencies of the functional areas on each other and the system, and failure rate apportionments throughout individual elements and logic within the functions. It has been assumed that failures will occur randomly throughout the system in that no specific section of the chip area will experience more failures than any other section of equal area. This technique uses complexity of the function as a criterion for the apportionment. Since over 99 percent of all elements are active transistors, it has been assumed that all elements within the function have an equal chance of failing. This approach considers the fact that ion migration, which is a prominent failure mechanism in MOS circuitry, is most dominant in active elements, and that there is a very small number of resistor-capacitor type elements. The necessity of developing an elaborate apportionment technique for active versus passive elements is thereby avoided. Table 4-4 provides a tabulation of the functional area complexity factors and failure rates. The basis for reliability allocation to each functional area is discussed below.

Pursuant to reference (a) and other research material on the subject, the following parameters for failure rate apportionment have been used.

- a. The probabilities of occurrence associated with the failure modes of an individual element (transistor, resistor, etc.) given that the element has failed are shorts 0.9 and opens 0.1. Shorts occur due to ion migration and pinholes in the oxide. Opens indicate a mechanical break in the wire or metalization paths. These probabilities reflect the relatively infrequent observance of open circuits in hermetically

TABLE 4-4. SYSTEM FAILURE RATE APPORTIONED BY FUNCTIONAL AREA

Functional Area Name	Complexity Factor	Failure Rate Associated with Functional Area (F/10 ⁶ Hrs.)
A - MOS CIRCUITRY		
1) Amplifier	.0172	0.464031
2) Clock Driver	.0098	0.265196
3) Clock Oscillator	.0061	0.165747
4) Compare	.1005	2.718260
5) Decoder	.0453	1.226532
6) Deploy Switch & Pulse Generator	.0270	0.729289
7) Differential Comparator	.0135	0.364645
8) Digital Differentiator	.0123	0.331495
9) Internal Control	.0257	0.696140
10) Power Detector	.0123	0.331495
11) Program Gates	.0882	2.386765
12) Program State Flip-Flops	.0809	2.187868
13) Subroutine Control	.0257	0.696140
14) Voltage Regulator	.0061	0.165748
15) 5-Bit Accumulator	.1103	2.983456
16) 5-Bit Register	.0613	1.657475
17) 7-Bit Counter	.1275	3.447549
18) 7-Bit Decoder	.0294	0.795588
19) 12-Bit Counter	.2010	5.436520
B - Clamp	-	0.020664
C - High Power Switch	-	0.196000

sealed packages. Moisture problems in plastic packages can cause corrosion of metalization which leads to opens. With hermetically sealed packages this problem is virtually eliminated.

- b. Where the analysis of a logic circuit shows that approximately half the element failures within that logic will result in the circuit sticking "high" and half the failures result in the circuit sticking "low", 0.5 will be used for the probability of each event occurring, given that a failure has occurred in that logic circuit.
- c. In a situation where many results are possible depending on the system status at the time of failure, and only one or a few of these results will cause a system malfunction, a worst case assumption is made.
- d. The assumption of partial shorts (in the case of resistors) and parameter changes are included in the appraisal of short/open failure modes. When a parameter change or partial short of an element would affect the system differently than short or open, it is noted in the FMEA tables. In these cases equal probability values are assigned to each mode. This provides consistency in our conservative prediction technique.
- e. Whenever an element failure mode (short, open) can be classified into more than one failure classification (I, II, III, or IV) depending on the system state when the element failure occurs, a linear apportionment of the failure rate was made. For example, a short in the input coupling capacitor (C4) of the differential comparator could make the system abnormally sensitive, nonsensitive or lockup depending on the balance of the amplifier output to reference at the time of failure (Time of failure is the deciding factor). The failure rate associated with a C4

short is .029835 failures/million hours. Accordingly, the probabilities associated with each failure classification will be 0.25 the above failure rate (sensitive corresponding to I or II and insensitive corresponding to III or IV).

The following conditions were considered in evaluation of each failure mode to provide accuracy and consistency in classification.

- a. A specific failure could cause a specific system effect which falls into only one failure classification.

Example: 5 Bit Accumulator - Flip Flop 4 - Stuck 1 - would cause the system to fire on the 8th cycle count instead of the 9th. This fits the definition of Class II only, i.e., firing between .5 and 1.0 of threshold cycle count.

In this case the failure rate assigned to the classification is equal to the element failure rate.

- b. A specific failure could cause the system to be completely inoperative. By definition this fits failure classification IV since the system would not operate at any signal level. Therefore, the element failure rate is also assigned to classification IV. This was by far the most common result of a system failure.
- c. A specific failure could cause the system to become insensitive, the degree depending on the status of the system at the time of failure. This insensitivity could be a class III or class IV failure. In this case the failure rate is assigned equally to class III and to class IV.

- d. A specific failure could cause the system to be some degree more sensitive or insensitive depending on the time and specific type of failure. This event includes the possibility of a class I or II, or III or IV failure. Only one classification will be encountered if the element fails but it is relatively impossible to determine in advance which classification the event will fit. For example: On a shorted pinch resistor, depending on how much of the resistor is shorted and whether the short occurs on the left or right side of the tap will determine what the system result will be. Therefore, failure rate is allocated equally to the four failure classes.
- e. A specific element failure could cause no apparent effect on the system. In this case the failure fits into no classification.

The FMEA tables in the appendix detail the system breakdown and failure rate apportionment.

Qualitative Analysis

For this analysis the system was divided into 21 functional areas and then subdivided into elements, gates or basic logic depending on their applicability to the function. Each subdivision was examined for possible failures and the effect of these failures on the function and the system. It was determined that short and open failure modes were the most prominent in this type of circuitry and most emphasis was placed on them. Failure analysis research performed on MOS circuitry indicates that ion migration and pinholes in the oxide are the most common cause of shorts. Very basically, ion migration is a phenomenon whereby impurity ions migrate to positions of opposite charge which induces migration of electrons or holes into the semiconductor in the adjacent junction area. This

causes channel formations of opposite charged material between junction areas which can cause short circuits.

Pinholes are associated with imperfections in the oxide usually resulting from process. This forms holes in the oxide in a thin oxide area. These two failure mechanisms are important in MOS circuitry because oxide is very thin. Electrical potential can break down the thin oxide layers more easily than in Bipolar circuits where the oxide layers are thicker.

Opens occur due to electromigration (metal migration). Simply stated, this is caused by a high current density in the metalization paths causing an erosion of metal ions. The metal simply migrates gradually, leaving gaps in the metal path. This discussion is by no means an attempt to provide a technical explanation of failure mechanisms but instead indicates the considerations involved in this analysis. An in-depth discussion of failure mechanisms can be found in references (a), (c), and (d).

By definition, failure classifications I and II are less desirable than failure classifications III and IV. Table 4-5 outlines a priority list of critical failures for the basic design, from the Failure Mode and Effects Analysis Tables, in order of significance. It should be noted, however, that comparison of their relative criticality to one another is not intended, but rather their criticality to the system.

The most important point that the FMEA emphasizes is the relatively fail-safe inter-dependent functional design of the system. Frequency, amplitude and cycle count are processed and evaluated individually by different functions in the circuit. A failure of any one area can only cause the system to act abnormally as to that one signal component. To provide a triggering signal the individual functional areas must provide proper processing of the signal components. In most cases a failure of one element will cause the system to become inoperative thus

TABLE 4-5. PRIORITY LIST OF CRITICALITY

Functional Area	Element	Failure Mode	Failure Rate Apportionment	Remarks
Deploy Switch & Pulse Generator	To input device	Open	.0081032135	Function is to reset FF for initialization. An open could cause system to trigger when auto operator is not present. See text for a solution to this potential problem.
Power on Detector	Capacitor	Open	.0033149509	No T_0 - Could fire prematurely. See text for a solution to this potential problem.
Power on Detector	Current Source	Short	.0298345588	No T_0 - Could fire prematurely. See text for a solution to this potential problem.
Power on Detector	Flip-Flop T_0	Open	.1193392353	Won't initialize pulse generator - could fire prematurely. See text for a solution to this potential problem.
Decoder	Series NAND Gate 1	Short	.1103878676	A short would cause system 150 ms timing check. Therefore, system could be armed by a signal that meets all requirements except an impact less than 150 ms after initial signal. The system would stay armed and possibly triggered later by a jar of bumper. See text.
Deploy Switch & Pulse Generator	Trigger Gate	Stuck High	.072928921	Signal off one cycle count. Won't need to wait for trigger gate to turn on before firing. However, all proper signal components are needed for triggering except impact.
Deploy Switch & Pulse Generator	Cross Couple Element	Short	.072928921	Signal off one cycle count. Won't need to wait for trigger gate to turn on before firing. However, all proper signal components are needed for triggering except impact.
Deploy Switch & Pulse Generator	Set Input	Short	.072928921	Same as above.

TABLE 4-5. PRIORITY LIST OF CRITICALITY (CONTINUED)

Functional Area	Element	Failure Mode	Failure Rate Apportionment	Remarks
5-Bit Accumulator	FF1	Stuck High	.2320465686	Will provide signal prematurely on cycle count. FF1 and FF4 one cycle prematurely (on 8th instead of 9th) and FF3 and FF5 on 9th cycle instead of 20th. However, input signal must have a proper frequency and amplitude before system could fire prematurely.
	FF3	Stuck High		
	FF4	Stuck High		
	FF5	Stuck High		
Program Gates	Dominant Reset	Stuck Low	.0828737745	Statistical random possibility of not re-setting and possibly arming system for triggering. Two out of twelve chances that random pattern will be an arming pattern. Also, accumulator count would have to come up and match on cycle count before system would be armed. Probability of all this happening is very low.
Internal Control	R _A Gate	Stuck Low	.0871074632	Random pattern of 0 and 1 in accumulator could cause improper frequency classification and possibly premature firing. Ripple counter is cleared and reset by R _A gate in internal control. (Random possibility only). A proper input signal with normal threshold amplitude is still needed.
Amplifier	R1	Partial Short	.031880016	Amplifier gain can increase, causing a smaller than threshold amplitude component of input signal to be acceptable for firing. However, frequency and cycle count are constraints and this signal is checked by other functions.

TABLE 4-5. PRIORITY LIST OF CRITICALITY (CONTINUED)

Functional Area	Element	Failure Mode	Failure Rate Apportionment	Remarks
Differential Comparator	C4	Short	.0298345588	A short of this input coupling capacitor could make system more sensitive (or insensitive) depending on balance of amplifier output to reference at time of failure. However, other system checks and balances will constrain most erroneous signals. See R1 above.
Differential Comparator	R2	Left Section Short or Right Section Open	.01160232839	Sets comparator threshold. Could make function abnormally sensitive resulting in premature firing. However, proper cycle count and impact switch still needed. This failure will boost amplitude only.
Clock Oscillator	RC1	Partial Short	.014917279	Will shift clock frequency. Proper amplitude and cycle count needed could cause premature firing.
Voltage Regulator	Q5 Q6	Short Open	.0298345581 .0033149509	Voltage increase causing minor frequency change in clock. Possibility of firing slightly above or below threshold due to out of spec. condition.

failing safe (classification IV). By definition this type of failure mode is least undesirable..

In some cases, however, a failure of an element, gate or logic could possibly cause a premature firing. All of these cases are listed in Table 4-5. The interdependency of design provides that most of these failures will be constrained by checks and balances in other functions within the system. For example, a partial short of R1 in the amplifier (No. 12 Table 4-5) can allow a small input signal to be processed as having a proper threshold amplitude. However, the system will not trigger unless the proper frequency and cycle count, which are processed and evaluated by different functional areas, are also present. This relationship can be understood more fully by examining items No. 6 through 16 in Table 4-5.

The most critical areas in the circuit from a premature firing standpoint are the deploy switch and pulse generator, and the power on detector functions. These areas provide for initialization of all functions. Individual failures of specific elements in these functions can cause the pulse generator not to initialize and result in the system triggering when the automobile ignition switch is activated (i.e., when starting the car). For example, an open T_0 input device in the pulse generator (No. 1 Table 4-5) inhibits T_0 signal into the flip-flop and prevents initialization. Specific failures in the current source (short) and capacitor (open) in the power detector function also prevent initialization. To reduce significantly the possibility of this occurring a redundant T_0 input device, current source, and capacitor have been added to the basic design. This insures that either T_0 or T_0' signal will be present even though a failure has occurred in the function.

In general, a failure of any other area will cause the system to become inoperative (failure classification IV). There are a few failures that will cause the system to be slightly insensitive (failure classification III). They can be seen by examining the FMEA tables.

RELIABILITY AND COST ANALYSIS

The basic system failure rates allocated to each failure classification are shown in Table 4-6. This represents the initial design configuration. The design of the basic MOS chip has been improved as described above by the addition of redundant elements in critical areas. These improvements result in a reduction of the Failure Rate of the basic chip as follows:

	Failure Classification			
	I	II	III	IV
Basic System (Table 4-6)	.729538	.729587	.151061	24.820457*
Redundant Built-in Elements	-.024678	-.016575		
Improved Basic System with Redundant Elements (λ)	.704860	.713012	.151061	24.820457*

The above failure rates were used for the reliability redundancy analysis.

Seven design configurations were considered for our reliability/cost study (Figures 4-1 through 4-7).

- a. Basic System
- b. Redundant MOS
- c. Redundant MOS & Bipolar
- d. MOS/Bipolar Redundant
- e. Voting MOS only
- f. Voting MOS & Redundant Bipolar
- g. Voting MOS/Bipolar

Also, each configuration was analyzed as to burn-in or no burn-in. This provided 14 variations of the basic design.

* Includes .077397 failure/million hours for the Bipolar circuit.

Table 4-6. BASIC SYSTEM FAILURE RATES BY CLASSIFICATION

Functional Area Name	Failure Classification Failure Rates (F/10 ⁶ Hrs.)			
	I	II	III	IV
A — MOS Circuitry				
1) Amplifier	.010627	.010627	.035422	.407356
2) Clock Driver	-	-	-	.265196
3) Clock Oscillator	.003729	.003725	.003729	.154560
4) Compare	-	-	-	2.718260
5) Decoder	.110388	-	-	1.054817
6) Deploy Switch & Pulse Generator	.081032	.145858	-	.421367
7) Differential Comparator	.015716	.015746	.015746	.317407
8) Digital Differentiator	-	-	-	.331495
9) Internal Control	-	.029036	.029036	.551141
10) Power Detector	.023205	.023205	-	.165749
11) Program Gates	.020718	.020718	.020719	2.324609
12) Program State Flip-Flops	-	-	-	2.187868
13) Subroutine Control	-	-	-	.348070
14) Voltage Regulator	-	.016575	.046409	.102763
15) 5-Bit Accumulator	.464063	.464097	-	2.055270
16) 5-Bit Register	-	-	-	1.657475
17) 7-Bit Counter	-	-	-	3.447549
18) 7-Bit Decoder	-	-	-	.795588
19) 12-Bit Counter	-	-	-	5.436519
B - Clamp	-	-	-	.018598
C - High Power Switch	-	-	-	.058800
TOTAL SYSTEM	.729538	.729587	.151061	24.820457

Costing estimates for the various configurations are shown in Table 4-1. Estimates were made for production levels of 100,000, 1,000,000, and 10,000,000 units per year based on the following factors. The following gives incremental costs for the desired system factors utilized in Table 4-1.

Criteria	Production Level		
	10 ⁵ /Year	10 ⁶ /Year	10 ⁷ /Year
1. Basic System (1 Basis MOS Chip & 1 Bipolar Chip)	\$3.25	\$2.50	\$2.00
2. Burn-In	0.30	0.25	0.20
3. Self Check Circuitry	0.05	0.03	0.02
4. Additional MOS Chips	1.00	0.80	0.60
5. Additional Bipolar Chips	0.30	0.20	0.15
6. Large Packaging (Needed for Voting Logic Designs)	0.30	0.25	0.20

The following considerations apply to the Reliability Cost Analysis:

- a. Any design using redundant circuits (not voting logic) must also have self check circuitry to determine when one path has failed. In these cases the cost and reliability of the test circuit are considered in the analysis. This self check circuit is identical in design to the indication circuit but without an indicator. Its exclusive use is to sense when one redundant path has failed so that the other path may take over. The additional cost of having the test circuit and system circuit on the same chip is minimal (about \$0.02 to \$0.05 per chip depending on production level).
- b. The failure rate for new MOS chips is not constant, but decreases with time during the first several hundred hours of operation due to early life failures. The question arises therefore whether the chip should be burned-in by the manufacturer. This problem is examined by evaluating

the failures saved by burn-in relative to the cost. The cost of burn-in buys: 1) a 100% screening before burn-in, 2) the burn-in itself, and 3) a 100% check after burn-in. To be consistent with the prediction model used previously, a factor of 2 is designated for MOS chips for processing using screens and burn-in comparable to RADC Spec 2867 based on limited testing (sample subjected to destructive tests to establish absolute limits of stressing which devices can withstand) to identify major failure modes and mechanisms to which screens are tailored. On the other hand, a factor of 1 is designated for optimum screening (100% burn-in). Therefore, placing a 2 in the basic prediction for π_Q instead of 1 yields the chip failure rates without 100% burn-in.

	<u>I</u>	<u>II</u>	<u>III</u>	<u>IV</u>
MOS	1.40972	1.426024	.302122	49.486120
BIPOLAR	-	-	-	.154795
TOTAL	1.40972	1.426024	.302122	49.640915

The cost of burn-in is estimated at \$0.20 to \$0.30 per chip depending on production level.

- c. Since the four failure classifications represent different degrees of acceptability, weighting factors were applied to each failure classification as a basis for relative consideration in the analysis. In this way a fair comparison of configurations could be made. A factor of 4 was utilized between successive failure classifications. That is, one Class I failure was as desirable (or undesirable) as 4 Class II failures, or 16 Class III failures or 64 Class IV failures. Refer to Table 4-7.

The last column of Table 4-1 contains the ranking of the configurations to each other based on a calculation of unreliability multiplied by cost. Since both unreliability

TABLE 4-7. FAILURE RATES AND WEIGHT FACTORS FOR BASIC BUILDING BLOCKS
($\lambda = F/10^6$ Hrs.)

<u>With Burn In:</u>		<u>Weighting Factors</u>	<u>MOS System</u>		<u>Bipolar</u>		<u>MOS System W/Self Check Test</u>	
<u>Failure Classification</u>			<u>Predicted F/R</u>	<u>Wt. F/R</u>	<u>Predicted F/R</u>	<u>Wt. F/R</u>	<u>Predicted F/R</u>	<u>Wt. F/R</u>
I	64		.704860	45.111040	0	0	.704860	45.111040
II	16		.713012	11.408192	0	0	.713012	11.408192
III	4		.151061	.604244	0	0	.151061	.604244
IV	1		24.743059	24.743059	.077397	.077397	29.253059	29.253059
Total	-		26.311992	81.866535	.077397	.077397	30.821992	86.376535
<u>Without Burn In:</u>								
I	64		1.40972	90.22208	0	0	1.40972	90.22208
II	16		1.426024	22.816384	0	0	1.426024	22.816384
III	4		.302122	1.208488	0	0	.302122	1.208488
IV	1		49.48612	49.48612	.154795	.154795	58.506118	58.506118
Total	-		52.623986	163.733072	.154795	.154795	61.643984	172.75307

and cost are parameters which should be minimized, the minimum "cost x reliability" calculation indicates the optimum configuration. Unreliability was used instead of reliability because reliability is an exponential function which is not directly compatible in this type of analysis with cost, which is a linear function. Unreliability can be shown to be approximately linear to failure rate by the first order expansion of the unreliability. That is:

$$\begin{aligned}U &= 1 - R \\&= 1 - e^{-\lambda T} \\&\simeq 1 - (1 - \lambda T) \\&\simeq \lambda T\end{aligned}$$

The most reliable systems are all burned-in, redundant design (not voting logic) and relatively medium priced. All of the redundant configurations are more reliable and cost less than the voting logic configurations. For instance the most reliable redundant design (Figure 4-3) costs \$4.90 and total system reliability is .999766; the most reliable voting logic design (Figure 4-6) costs \$6.15 and total system reliability is .999492.

Configurations not burned-in are at the bottom of the reliability scale. Another very important feature of the redundant configuration is the fact that circuit failure indication is already built in. Only an indicator on the auto dashboard and very minor circuitry are needed. The impact of the addition of an indication system and maintenance on reliability is discussed below.

The range of costs considered for the 14 configurations represents a full range of available circuits.


Figure 4-3 has the highest total system reliability. This calculation (total system reliability) indicates the probability that the system will not fail due to any combination of system failure classification failures. The breakdown into failure classification for Figure 4-3 configuration is as follows:

Classification Number

	<u>I</u>	<u>II</u>	<u>III</u>	<u>IV</u>	<u>Total System</u>
T = 500 Hrs.	.99999987	.99999987	.99999999	.99978917	.999766
T = 2500 Hrs.	.99999690	.99999682	.99999986	.99502654	.994500
T = 5000 Hrs.	.99998762	.99998733	.99999942	.98148439	.979602

For example, at T = 500 Hrs. (1 year operation) the probability of a Class I failure is 13 chances in 100 million. At T = 5000 hrs. (10 years operation), the probability of a Class IV failure is about 1 in 50. These results are representative for the other redundant circuits (Figures 4-2 and 4-4). The above calculations demonstrate the high fail safe design of this system. If the system does fail, it will fail safe rather than triggering accidentally. These calculations have been made for a system without repair. The calculations below show the effect maintenance has on the reliability, i.e., with the addition of a dashboard indicator lamp and immediate replacement when the lamp lights.

The test circuit will check the system every time the car engine is started (assuming 0.5 hr.). The system reliability follows a sawtooth curve:



Every time the test finds the system functioning properly, the reliability curve starts over again. Therefore, the reliability of the circuit at $t = .5$ is:

$$R(t) = e^{-\lambda t}$$

$$R_1(t) \geq R_1(t = .5) = e^{-\lambda_1 \times .5}$$

$$R_{\text{sys}}(t) = R_I \times R_{II}$$

where R_I = Reliability of the MOS circuit (1 out of 2)

R_{II} = Reliability of the Bipolar circuit (1 out of 2)

The test circuit does not check the Bipolar circuit, therefore, the reliability of Configuration 3 with a failure indication system is:

$$R_{\text{sys}}(t) \geq \left[1 - (1 - R_{I(.5)})^2 \right] \left[1 - (1 - R_{II(t)})^2 \right]$$

For $t = 500$ hrs:

$$R_{\text{sys}}(t) \geq \left[1 - (1 - e^{-\lambda_1 .5})^2 \right] \left[1 - (1 - e^{-\lambda_2 500})^2 \right]$$

Similarly for $R = 2500$ and 5000 hrs. The table below gives the calculated values:

	<u>Classification Number</u>			
	<u>I</u>	<u>II</u>	<u>III</u>	<u>IV</u>
T = 500 Hrs.	1	1	1	.9999999983
T = 2500 Hrs.	1	1	1	.9999999624
T = 5000 Hrs.	1	1	1	.9999998501

It can be seen that the system reliability, when a failure indicator and maintenance philosophy are introduced, is greatly increased. In fact, the system reliability is now almost wholly dependent on the reliability of the redundant Bipolar circuit.

SECTION 5. REPORT SUMMARY

OVERALL DESIGN PLAN

The Burroughs approach to the Crash Sensor Signal Processor is based on a digital, MOS integrated circuit technology. There are many advantages to this method of implementation, the most important being as follows:

1. Digital processing is highly accurate and sophisticated decision criteria can be readily implemented.
2. Because discrete (analog) components are largely absent, size, cost, and unreliable soldered connections are minimized.
3. MOS technology permits a high device count per chip, so that redundancy and self-checking can be included to improve reliability.
4. The analog properties of MOS devices are compatible with the preamplification required for interfacing the radar system with the digital processor, so that the entire system except for the high power output driver can be incorporated on a single chip.
5. The MOS process requires a minimum number of diffusion steps, and is thus inherently low in cost, offers a high yield, and is amenable to very high production rates.

REDUNDANT CIRCUITRY COST/EFFECTIVENESS

The cost/effectiveness of providing a redundant processing channel is excellent. The improvement in reliability is formidable. For example, the basic system (with burn-in) has a 500-hour reliability of 0.986892, whereas the addition of one redundant processing and output channel increases the reliability to 0.999766. At the same time, the component cost increases from \$3.55 to only \$4.90.

The low cost of providing redundancy is inherent in the MOS process. Integrated circuit costs tend to vary according to the linear dimensions of the chip, whereas the device count increases as the square of the linear dimensions. This advantage is obtained subject to a restriction on maximum chip size. Fortunately, the level of complexity involved in the processor permits redundancy on a single chip. The same advantage applies to the bipolar circuitry; however, the proportion of total cost in the latter is small and the effect on cost negligible in any case.

SELF-TESTING

The advantages of the MOS integrated circuit with regard to built-in redundancy also apply to the incorporation of self-checking routines, and the improvement in reliability is similarly quite significant. If the self-checking occurs each time the engine is started, the MOS reliability for extended periods is essentially that for a single engine start-stop cycle (assuming that failure indication is heeded and replacement made). The entire system reliability then becomes that of the output switch, which is not so readily self-tested.

COSTS

The active component cost of the least reliable system (no redundancy or burn-in) is \$3.25, as compared to \$4.90. for the most reliable system (based on 100,000 pieces/year). The packaging and interconnection costs are essentially identical, so that the relative cost of redundancy becomes even less significant. When the costs of the radar unit and the restraint mechanism itself are considered, it becomes obvious that there is a strong case for considering the high reliability system as the primary means of implementation.

FAILURE RATE PREDICTION

The reliability figures and failure rates developed in the report can be placed in perspective if applied to the total vehicle-hour usage in the United States during a one-year period, and if compared with accident statistics.

The analysis presented in Section 4 for the redundant processor system predicts reliability in excess of 0.999999 for 500 hours (one year of vehicle operation) for failure modes resulting in unwarranted deployment. Thus, less than one vehicle per million per year will experience such a failure, and the total for 100,000,000 U.S. vehicles will be less than 100. It is likely that a higher number of unwarranted deployments will result from other causes, such as shorts in wiring harnesses and failure to properly maintain equipment. With self-checking and failure indication upon engine starting, the number of such failures becomes vanishingly small.

The reliability for failure modes resulting in failure to deploy is somewhat lower (0.9998). In this case, 20,000 vehicles per year may experience potential failure to deploy, but only a small percentage of these will be placed in a situation where deployment is necessary. Again, failure of external connections is likely to be the overriding cause of trouble, and the use of self-checking and failure indication reduces processor system failures to negligible proportions.

When the above figures are contrasted with the U.S. toll of 50,000 deaths, 2,000,000 injuries, and 25,000,000 reportable accidents per year, it becomes evident that the proposed system represents a potential saving in both absolute dollars and in the human cost of accidents, which far outweighs the cost of its installation.

APPENDIX A

Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) Tables

AMPLIFIER - Differential amplifier with current sources followed by 2 stages of amplification (single ended) & feedback from last stage Page 1 of 2

NAME & CODE	FUNCTION	FAILURE MODE	FAILURE MECHANISM	EFFECT OF FAILURE ON		APPORTIONED FAILURE RATE (F/10 ⁶ HRS.)	REMARKS	FAILURE CLASSIF.			
				FUNCTION AREA	SYSTEM			I	II	III	IV
Q ₉	Differential amplifier current source	Short	Hole in oxide ion migration	Lock-up	Won't operate	.03188002					N
		Open	Electromigration	Lock-up	Won't operate	.00354222					N
Q ₁₀	The differential amplifier	Short	Hole in oxide ion migration	Lock-up	Won't operate	.03188002					N
		Open	Electromigration	Lock-up	Won't operate	.00354222					N
Q ₁₁	Load	Short	Hole in oxide ion migration	Lock-up	Won't operate	.03188002					N
		Open	Electromigration	Lock-up	Won't operate	.00354222					N
Q ₁₂	The differential amplifier	Short	Hole in oxide ion migration	Lock-up	Won't operate	.03188002					N
		Open	Electromigration	Lock-up	Won't operate	.00354222					N
C ₁	Input coupling capacitor	Short	Hole in oxide ion migration	Lock-up amplifier high	Won't operate	.03188002					N
		Open	Electromigration	No signal	Won't operate	.00354222					N
NODE	Signal Input	Open	Wire bonds	No signal	Won't operate	.00354222					N
Q ₁₃	2nd amplifier stage	Short	Hole in oxide ion migration	Lock-up	Won't operate	.03188002					N
		Open	Electromigration	Lock-up	Won't operate	.00354222					N
Q ₁₄	2nd amplifier stage load	Short	Hole in oxide ion migration	Lock-up	Won't operate	.03188002					N
		Open	Electromigration	Lock-up	Won't operate	.00354222					N
R ₁	Feedback resistor	Short	Hole in oxide ion migration	Lock-up	Won't operate	Apportion to Partial Short					
		Open	Electromigration	Insensitivity	Won't operate	.00354222	(Continued)				N

NAME & CODE	FUNCTION	FAILURE MODE	FAILURE MECHANISM	EFFECT OF FAILURE ON		APPROXIMATED FAILURE RATE (F/10 ⁶ HRS.)	REMARKS	FAILURE CLASSIF.			
				FUNCTION AREA	SYSTEM			I	II	III	IV
R ₁ (continued)		Partial Short	Same as short	Gain can increase	Fire when it should not	.03188002	When Right side: more resistance Left side: smaller resistance	X	X	X	X
C ₂	Feedback resistance shunting capacitor	Short Open	Hole in oxide Ion migration Electromigration (metalization)	Insensitivity Oscillation	Won't operate Slight insensitivity	.03188002 .00354222	For stability			X	
R ₃₃	Stabilizing network resistor	Short Open	Hole in oxide Ion migration Electromigration (metalization)	Oscillation Won't operate	Insensitivity Won't operate	.03188002 .00354222				X	X
C ₃	Stabilizing capacitor	Short Open	Hole in oxide Ion migration Electromigration	Lock-up No signal	Won't operate Won't operate	.03188002 .00354222					X
Q ₁₅	3rd amplifier stage	Short Open	Hole in oxide Ion migration Electromigration	Lock-up Lock-up	Won't operate Won't operate	.03188002 .00354222					X
Q ₁₆	3rd amplifier state load	Short Open	Hole in oxide Ion migration Electromigration	Lock-up Lock-up	Won't operate Won't operate	.03188002 .00354222					X

COMPARATORS (2) - Compares initial input signal with subsequent cycle inputs. Comp-1: Subsequent cycles. Comp-2: Initial input cycle.

NAME & CODE	FUNCTION	FAILURE MODE	FAILURE MECHANISM	EFFECT OF FAILURE ON		APPORTIONED FAILURE RATE (FA06 HRS)	REMARKS	FAILURE CLASSIF.			
				FUNCTION AREA	SYSTEM			I	II	III	IV
Exclusive OR ₁	Defines match between bits of information	Stuck high	Hole in oxide Ion migration	Get X when you shouldn't	See note for 7-bit decoder.	.27182598	Comparator ₁ - establishes high limit				X
		Stuck low	Electromigration Ion migration (Leakage)	Don't get signal when you should Faulty data		.27182598	Comparator ₂ - establishes low limit See remarks for decode for 7-bit reg.				X
Exclusive OR ₂	Defines match between bits of information	Stuck high	Hole in oxide Ion migration			.27182598	For purpose of failure analysis all exclusive OR gates are identical in function failure modes and effects.				X
		Stuck low	Electromigration Ion migration (Leakage)			.27182598					X
Exclusive OR ₃	Defines match between bits of information	Stuck high	Hole in oxide Ion migration			.27182598					X
		Stuck low	Electromigration Ion migration (Leakage)			.27182598					X
Exclusive OR ₄	Defines match between bits of information	Stuck high	Hole in oxide Ion migration			.27182598					X
		Stuck low	Electromigration Ion migration (Leakage)			.27182598					X
Exclusive OR ₅	Defines match between bits of information	Stuck high	Hole in oxide Ion migration	Get X when you shouldn't	↗	.27182598					X
		Stuck low	Electromigration Ion migration (Leakage)	Don't get signal when you should Faulty data		.27182598					X

DECODER - Internal timing of generating Ta signal.

NAME & CODE	FUNCTION	FAILURE MODE	FAILURE MECHANISM	EFFECT OF FAILURE ON		APPORTIONED FAILURE RATE (F106 HRS.)	REMARKS	FAILURE CLASSIF.			
				FUNCTION AREA	SYSTEM			I	II	III	IV
Series NAND gate 1	\overline{T}_I Internal timing	Short	Hole in oxide Ion migration	Lose timing check	Possibility of firing erroneously	.11038737	150 ms timing check could arm system and then fire an hour later	X			
		Open	Electromigration	Lock-up	Won't process signal	.01226532				X	
Series NAND gate 2	$\overline{8t}_1$ Internal timing	Short	Hole in oxide Ion migration	Lock-up	Won't process signal	.11038737				X	
		Open	Electromigration	Accept slightly low frequency	None. Second check would correct the signal.	.01226532	<500 Hz; another failure would be needed to complement this for improper operation.				
Series NAND gate 3	$\overline{8t}_2$ Internal timing	Short	Hole in oxide Ion migration	Lock-up	Same as #2	.11038737	Same as #2	X			
		Open	Electromigration	Improper freq. (low)	Above	.01226532	Above				
Series NAND gate 4	$\overline{8t}_3$ Internal timing	Short	Hole in oxide Ion migration	Lock-up	Same as #2	.11038737	Same as #2				
		Open	Electromigration	Improper freq. (low)	Above	.01226532	Above				
Series NAND gate 5	\overline{t}_1 Internal timing	Short	Hole in oxide Ion migration	Lock-up	Won't process signal	.11038737	Initial Freq. Check	X			
		Open	Electromigration	Low freq. accepted; Start to process low freq.	System will correct; No effect on system operation.	.01226532					
Series NAND gate 6	$\overline{8t}_4$ Internal Timing	Short	Hole in oxide Ion migration	Lock-up	Same as #2	.11038737	Same as #2	X			
		Open	Electromigration	Improper freq. (high)	Above	.01226532	Above				

DECODER (continued)

NAME & CODE	FUNCTION	FAILURE MODE	FAILURE MECHANISM	EFFECT OF FAILURE ON		APPROX- TIONED FAIL. RATE (F/10 ⁶ HRS.)	REMARKS	FAILURE CLASSIF.			
				FUNCTION AREA	SYSTEM			I	II	III	IV
Series NAND gate 7	ta ₄ bit of T _a	Short	Hole in oxide Ion migration	Lock-up	Won't process	.11038787	A signal output is compared to signal of the 8-bit counter. If they are not identical system won't process; therefore erroneous signals will not be processed.				N
		Open	Electromigration	Erroneous signal	Won't process	.01226532					X
Series NAND gate 8	ta ₃ bit of T _a	Short	Hole in oxide Ion migration	Lock-up	Won't process	.11038787	Same as #7				N
			Electromigration	Erroneous signal	Won't process	.01226532	Above				X
Series NAND gate 9	t ₄ Internal timing & ta ₂ bit of T _a	Short	Hole in oxide Ion migration	Lock-up	Won't process	.11038787	Same as #7				N
		Open	Electromigration	Erroneous signal	Won't process	.01226532	Above				X
Series NAND gate 10	ta ₁ bit of T _a	Short	Hole in oxide Ion migration	Lock-up	Won't process	.11038787	Same as #7				N
		Open	Electromigration	Erroneous signal	Won't process	.01226532	Above				N

-DEPLOY SWITCH & PULSE GENERATOR - a) Pulse Generator; b) Trigger Gate

a) Pulse Generator - 1) Turns current section on for output. 2) Insures no power until system stabilizes. 3) D-c operation instead of clock

NAME & CODE	FUNCTION	FAILURE MODE	FAILURE MECHANISM	EFFECT OF FAILURE ON		APPORTIONED FAILURE RATE (FA06 HRS.)	REMARKS	FAILURE CLASSIF.			
				FUNCTION AREA	SYSTEM			I	II	III	IV
A input device	Reset	Short	Hole in oxide Ion migration	Resets continuously	No operation	.07292892					X
		Open	Electromigration	No reset	Will fire on proper signal	.00810321					
T ₀ input device	Initialization	Short	Hole in oxide Ion migration	No output	No operation	.07292892					X
		Open	Electromigration	Turns power on	Possibility of firing of system inappropriately	.00810321	System could fire on initial start up.	X			
Cross couple feedback element	FF coupling	Short	Hole in oxide Ion migration	No output	No operation	.07292892					X
		Open	Electromigration	No state change	No operation	.00810321					X
Pull-Up device	Pull up top half	Short	Hole in oxide Ion migration	Function goes high No output	No operation	.07292892					X
		Open	Electromigration	Function goes low	No operation	.00810321	Turns on half of driver (upper section); will not cause a firing in itself. Won't get a long enough deploy signal to deploy.				X
Inverter switch device	Switching	Short	Hole in oxide Ion migration	Turns on top half of driver	Will operate properly with proper parameters.	.07292892	If the proper parameters are present, bottom half will turn on and system will operate properly.				
		Open	Electromigration	No signal to driver.	No operation	.00810321					X
Set input	Input to driver	Short	Hole in oxide Ion migration	Turns on bottom half; other half is held at reset	Premature firing	.07292892	Premature firing on cycle count.	X	X		
			Electromigration	Never set FF; always on reset	No output	.00810321				X	
Cross couple	FF Cross Coupling	Short	Hole in oxide Ion migration	Bottom half signal to driver	Early deploy	.07292892	In terms of cycles, no need to wait for trigger gate pulse	X	X		
		Open	Electromigration	No output	No operation	.00810321					X

a) Pulse Generator (continued)

NAME & CODE	FUNCTION	FAILURE MODE	FAILURE MECHANISM	EFFECT OF FAILURE ON		APPORTIONED FAIL. RATE (F/10 ⁶ HRS.)	REMARKS	FAILURE CLASSIF.			
				FUNCTION AREA	SYSTEM			I	II	III	IV
Pull-up device	Pull-up (bottom half)	Short	Hole in oxide Ion migration	Function goes high; No output	No operation	.07292892					X
		Open	Electromigration	Function goes low	No operation	.00810321	Turns on half of driver (bottom section); Will not cause a firing in itself. Won't get a long enough deploy signal to deploy.				X
b) Trigger gate	Trigger for output signal to fire system Sets flip-flop and resets counter Triggers after frequency is classified	Stuck high	Hole in oxide Ion migration	Signal off 1 cycle count	Won't need to wait for trigger gate to turn on erroneous display	.07292892			N		
		Stuck low	Electromigration	No trigger pulse to flip-flop.	No output	.00810321					X

DIFFERENTIAL COMPARATOR (1-Volt Threshold)- Establishes signal threshold.

NAME & CODE	FUNCTION	FAILURE MODE	FAILURE MECHANISM	EFFECT OF FAILURE ON		APPORTIONED FAILURE RATE (F/10 ⁶ HRS.)	REMARKS	FAILURE CLASSIF.			
				FUNCTION AREA	SYSTEM			I	II	III	IV
C4	Input Coupling Capacitor	Short Open	Hole in oxide Ion migration Electromigration	Comparator Sensitivity No input signal	Could make system abnormally sensitive, nonsensitive operation lockup. Won't operate.	.02983456 .00331495	Depends on Bal. of Ampl. output to reference. Could put a check device to determine if system moves to sensitive area. System could be shut down, etc.	X	X	X	X
R44	Comparator bias voltage resistor	Short Open		Lose input signal Lose ref. on comparator Lock Comparator	Won't operate. Won't operate	.02983456 .00331495					X
Q17	Current Source	Short Open		Lock-up Lock-up	Won't operate Won't operate	.02983456 .00331495					X
Q18	The Comparator	Short Open		Lock-up Lock-up	Won't operate Won't operate	.02983456 .00331495					X
Q19	Load	Short Open		Lock-up Lock-up	Won't operate Won't operate	.02983456 .00331495					X
Q20	The Comparator	Short Open		Lock-up Lock-up	Won't operate Won't operate	.02983456 .00331495					X
Q21	2nd Stage	Short Open		Lock-up Lock-up	Won't operate Won't operate	.02983456 .00331495					X
Q22	2nd Stage Load	Short Open		Lock-up Lock-up	Won't operate Won't operate	.02983456 .00331495					X
Q23	3rd Stage	Short Open		Lock-up Lock-up	Won't operate Won't operate	.02983456 .00331495					X
Q24	3rd Stage Load	Short Open	Hole in oxide Ion migration Electromigration	Lock-up Lock-up	Won't operate Won't operate	.02983456 .00331495					X
				Lock-up	Won't operate	.00331495					X

DIFFERENTIAL COMPARATOR (continued)

NAME & CODE	FUNCTION	FAILURE MODE	FAILURE MECHANISM	EFFECT OF FAILURE ON		APPORTIONED FAILURE RATE (F/10 ⁶ HRS.)	REMARKS	FAILURE CLASSIF.			
				FUNCTION AREA	SYSTEM			I	II	III	IV
R2	Comparator Offset Resistor (Set Comparator Threshold)	Short	Hole in oxide Ion migration	Abnormal sensitivity Insensitive	Premature firing Operation retarded	.00994485 .00994485	Left Shorts Right Shorts	X	X	X	X
		Open	Electromigration	Insensitive Abnormal sensitivity	Operation Retarded Premature firing	.00165747 .00165747	Left Sect. opens Right Sect. opens	X	X	X	X
		Parameter Change		Somewhat more sensitive or insensitive	Premature firing or operation retarded	.00994485		X	X	X	X

[illegible]

POWER ON DETECTOR - Initialize all functions and constrain all operations until oscillator comes up to speed.

NAME & CODE	FUNCTION	FAILURE MODE	FAILURE MECHANISM	EFFECT OF FAILURE ON		APPORTIONED FAILURE RATE (FA05 IIRS)	REMARKS	FAILURE CLASSIF.			
				FUNCTION AREA	SYSTEM			I	II	III	IV
Flip-Flop T_o	Provides T_o signal associated with pulse generation.	Short	Hole in oxide Ion migration	Stuck 1	Nothing works	. 11933923	All FF locked into steady state.				N
		Open Parameter change	Electromigration Ion migration (leakage)	Stuck 0 - Won't initialize pulse generator	Could fire prematurely	. 01325980	\bar{A} won't be present.	N	N		
Flip-Flop \bar{T}_o	Provides \bar{T}_o signal	Short	Hole in oxide Ion migration	Won't initialize 14-bit register	No effect	. 11933923	When oscillator comes up to speed the 14-bit register will be reset.				
		Open	Electromigration	Stuck 0 No reset	No operation	. 01325980					N
		Parameter Change	Ion migration (Leakage)								
Current Source I	Keeps power off most of system until oscillator comes up.	Short	Hole in oxide Ion migration	No T_o	Could fire prematurely	. 02983456	No initialization.	N	N		
		Open	Electromigration	Constant T_o	Hangs up	. 00331495					N
		Parameter Change	Ion migration (Leakage)								
Capacitor	Provides capacitance for the circuit.	Short	Hole in oxide Ion migration	Constant T_o	No firing	. 02983456	Constrains pulse generator.				N
		Open Parameter Change	Electromigration Ion migration (Leakage)	No T_o	Could fire prematurely	. 00331495		X	X		

PROGRAM STATES - Tell flip-flops when to change state as a function of data and other flip-flops

NAME & CODE	FUNCTION	FAILURE MODE	FAILURE MECHANISM	EFFECT OF FAILURE ON		APPORTIONED FAIL. RATE (E-106 IIRS)	REMARKS	FAILURE CLASSIF.			
				FUNCTION AREA	SYSTEM			I	II	III	IV
Set & Reset Gate for FF _A		J _A Hi K _A Lo		Process to S12 & then jump to S6 & then reset	No operation	16574755					N
		J _A Lo K _A Hi		Process to S3 & then get stuck	No operation	16574755					N
Set & Reset Gate for FF _B		J _B Hi K _B Lo		Stuck S21	No operation	21547181					N
		J _B Lo K _B Hi		Stuck in S12 with signal; No signal steady state	No operation	21547181					N
Set & Reset Gate for FF _C		J _C Hi K _C Lo		Stuck in S3; no further processing	No operation	29834559					N
		J _C Lo K _C Hi		Circulate between S3 and S01	No operation	29834559					N
Set & Reset Gate for FF _D		J _D Hi K _D Lo		Counter will always be running; never get to steady state	No operation	43094363					N
		J _D Lo K _D Hi		Program locked into S0	No operation	43094363					N
Dominant Reset	Forces all FF _i to initialize (Reset at initialization at T ₀ & T ₁)	High Low		Force FF to steady state	No operation	08287377					N
				No initialization; random pattern	Random possibility of arming for firing	08287377				X	X

PROGRAM STATE FLIP-FLOPS - Define states and state flow diagram; identifies what state the program is in and where to go next.

NAME & CODE	FUNCTION	FAILURE MODE	FAILURE MECHANISM	EFFECT OF FAILURE ON		APPORTIONED FAILURE RATE (F/10 ⁶ HRS)	REMARKS	FAILURE CLASSIF.			
				FUNCTION AREA	SYSTEM			I	II	III	IV
Flip-Flop _A	Setting function for deploy	Q _A HI		Process to S12 and then jump to S6 and then resets	No operation	.27348346					X
		Q _A Lo		Process to S3 and then gets stuck	No operation	.27348346					X
		Q _A HI		Stuck in S21	No operation	.27348346					X
		Q _B HI		Stuck in S12 with signal	No operation	.27348346					X
Flip-Flop _B	Setting function for deploy Classifying frequency	Q _B HI		No signal; steady state	No operation	.27348346					X
		Q _B Lo		Stuck in S3; no further processing	No operation	.27348346					X
		Q _C HI		Circulate between S3 and S01	No operation	.27348346					X
		Q _C Lo		Counter will always be running; never get to steady state	No operation	.27348346					X
Flip-Flop _C	Subcondition of fixing, deploying and classifying	Q _D HI		Program locked into S0	No operation	.27348346					X
		Q _D Lo									
		Q _D HI									
		Q _D Lo									
Flip-Flop _D	Subcondition of fixing, deploying and classifying	Q _D HI									
		Q _D Lo									
		Q _D HI									
		Q _D Lo									

SUBROUTINE CONTROL - Control for subroutine control.

[illegible]

VOLTAGE REGULATOR - Provides separate voltage regulation for a) clock and b) comparator and amplifier

NAME & CODE	FUNCTION	FAILURE MODE	FAILURE MECHANISM	EFFECT OF FAILURE ON		APPORTIONED FAILURE RATE (F10 ⁻⁶ HRS.)	REMARKS	FAILURE CLASSIF.			
				FUNCTION AREA	SYSTEM			I	II	III	IV
Q ₆	Enhancement voltage device for clock	Short	Hole in oxide Ion migration	Clock Falls	Won't operate	.02983456					X
		Open	Electromigration	Voltage increase	Minor freq. change in Clock	.00331495	Out of spec behavior possibly firing slightly below or above threshold.		X	X	
Q ₅	Depletion mode current source for clock	Short	Hole in oxide Ion migration	Voltage increase	Minor freq. change in clock	.02983456	Exactly opposite effort of Q ₆ .	X	X		
		Open	Electromigration	Clock fails	Won't operate	.00331495	System will not fire.				X
Q ₇	Enhancement voltage device for amplifier comparator	Short	Hole in oxide Ion migration	No voltage regulation	Amplifier will lock-up	.02983456					X
		Open	Electromigration			.00331495					X
Q ₈	Depletion mode current source for clock	Short	Hole in oxide Ion migration	No voltage regulation	Amplifier will lock-up	.02983456	System will not fire.				X
		Open	Electromigration			.00331495					X
R ₂₂	Bias voltage resistor	Short	Hole in oxide Ion migration	Signal shorted out	Won't operate	.02983456	Abnormally insensitive (it is possible that a large signal might make it come back to active response).			X	
		Open	Electromigration	Loss reference; amplifier lock-up	Won't operate	.00331495					X

CYCLE COUNT ACCUMULATOR (5 bit) - 1) Determines how many cycles have accumulated and 2) counts number of input cycles since initial cycle. Represented in binary form: When this registers 8 cycles, an output pulse is introduced, and when compared to long count of 12-bit counter, this classifies frequency.

NAME & CODE	FUNCTION	FAILURE MODE	FAILURE MECHANISM	EFFECT OF FAILURE ON		APPORTIONED FAILURE RATE (F10 ⁶ HRS.)	REMARKS	FAILURE CLASSIF.			
				FUNCTION AREA	SYSTEM			I	II	III	IV
Flip-flop ₁ (FF ₁)	Counting and provides N ₉ information with FF ₄	Stuck 0 Stuck 1	Hole in oxide Ion migration Electromigration	Never gets N ₉ signal Will provide signal one cycle prematurely	Reject on time Fires on 8th cycle instead of 9th	.23204657 .23204657	See remarks for digital differentiator stuck high, stuck low		X		X
Flip-flop ₂ (FF ₂)	Relay data to other flip-flops for count	Stuck 0 Stuck 1	Hole in oxide Ion migration Electromigration	Locksup counter Locksup counter	Required signal not present; won't operate Required signal not present; won't operate	.23204657 .23204657					X
Flip-flop ₃ (FF ₃)	Counting and provides N ₂₀ information with FF ₅	Stuck 0 Stuck 1	Hole in oxide Ion migration Electromigration	No output Will provide signal prematurely.	Reject Will fire on 9th cycle instead of 20th cycle.	.23204657 .23204657			X		
Flip-flop ₄ (FF ₄)	Counting and provides N ₉ information with FF ₁	Stuck 0 Stuck 1	Hole in oxide Ion migration Electromigration	Never gets N ₉ signal. Will provide signal one cycle prematurely	Reject on time. Fires on 8th cycle instead of 9th cycle.	.23204657 .23204657				X	
Flip-flop ₅ (FF ₅)	Counting Provides N ₁₆ inform. Provides N ₂₀ inform. with FF ₃	Stuck 0 Stuck 1	Hole in oxide Ion migration Electromigration	No output Will provide signal prematurely.	Reject Will fire on 9th cycle instead of 20th cycle.	.23204657 .23204657					X
Inverter NOR Gates 1 through 4	Advances next higher bit	Stuck Hi Stuck Lo	Hole in oxide Ion migration Electromigration	No counting or only partial count Won't count	System reject Won't operate	.23204657 .23204657					X

5-BIT REGISTER - Stores signal T_a from 12-bit counter; provides signal T_a information to the compare function.

[illegible]

7-BIT COUNTER - Creates a subroutine, single period consistency; catches failure of Ta signal;
fine tuning of frequency input analysis.

NAME & CODE	FUNCTION	FAILURE MODE	FAILURE MECHANISM	EFFECT OF FAILURE ON		APPORTIONED FAILURE RATE (FAOR HRS.)	REMARKS	FAILURE CLASSIF.			
				FUNCTION AREA	SYSTEM			I	II	III	IV
Register Bits 1 through 7	Checks the frequency component for 7 cycles before decision to accept and classifies it as a firing, non-firing situation.	Stuck high Stuck low	Hole in oxide Ion migration Electromigration	Lock-up Lock-up	No data through No data through	1.22412972 1.22412972	System won't complete processing properly. Can't produce the correct count.				X X
Sampling Hold flip-flop	Converts very short pulse to level	Stuck high Stuck low	Hole in oxide Ion migration Electromigration	No counting activity No counting activity	Lock-up Lock-up	.12491120 .12491120					X X
Toggle Gates	Instructs successive flip-flops to set or reset	Stuck high Stuck low	Hole in oxide Ion migration Electromigration	No advance successive No advance successive	Lock-up Lock-up	.37473359 .37473359					X X

7-BIT DECODER - Part of the system to detect failure of T_a signal and fine tuning of frequency input.

NAME & CODE	FUNCTION	FAILURE MODE	FAILURE MECHANISM	EFFECT OF FAILURE ON		APPORTIONED FAIL. RATE (F/10 ⁵ HRS.)	REMARKS	FAILURE CLASSIF.			
				FUNCTION AREA	SYSTEM			I	II	III	IV
NOR Gates 1—5	Provides cycle information (subsequent to initial cycle) to the compare function	Stuck high Stuck Low	Hole in Oxide Ion Migration Electromigration	Get X when you shouldn't. Don't get signal when you should Faulty Data	See note below	.79558823	Whether an element sticks high or low depends on the status of that element at the time of failure. Statistically we will assume that there is a 50 percent chance of a failure causing a high condition and 50 percent, a low condition.				X X
NOTE: The system effect of a failure is dependent on the time of failure, system programming, etc. If a failure causes a code which doesn't match with the compared code at the 5-bit accumulation output in the compare function, the system will hang up and won't operate (Class IV). If the resultant code is what is expected, an X output could be provided when it shouldn't. However, the system won't process when the conditions for firing are not present. This is checked for along the processing.											

CLAMP - Protects MOS system from large voltage spikes.

NAME & CODE	FUNCTION	FAILURE MODE	FAILURE MECHANISM	EFFECT OF FAILURE ON		APPORTIONED FAILURE RATE (F7006 HRS.)	REMARKS	FAILURE CLASSIF.			
				FUNCTION AREA	SYSTEM			I	II	III	IV
Clamp	To protect MOS system from large voltage spikes (one zener device)	Short	Hole in oxide ion migration	Shunt all current B+ to ground	No operation	.01859793					X
		Open	Electromigration	Lose circuit protection	No apparent effect	.00206647	The system will not be affected unless a voltage spike "zaps" the system.				

HIGH POWER SWITCH (Current Driver) - High current switching deploy signal.

[illegible]

APPENDIX B

REPORT OF INVENTIONS

After a diligent review of the work performed under this contract no new innovation, discovery, improvement or invention was made.

References

- (a) MOS Integrated Circuit Reliability, Schnable, Ewald & Schlegal, IEEE Transactions on Reliability, Vol R-21, No. 1 - February, 1972.
- (b) Procedural guidelines for the reliability assessment of MOS micro-circuits, Ewald, Philco-Ford Corp, Final Report prepared for RADC, RADC-TR-71-178 - September, 1971.
- (c) Some Reliability Considerations to LSI Technology, Schlecter, Keen & Schnable, IEEE Journal of Solid-State Circuits, Vol SC-6, No. 5 - October, 1971.
- (d) Failure Mechanisms in Large-Scale Integrated Circuits, Schnable & Keen, IEEE Transactions on Electron Devices, Vol ED-16, No. 4 - April, 1969.

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